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  OPINION 
_____________________      
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Under the rules governing appellate procedure, a 
notice of appeal must ―designate the judgment‖ from which 
the appeal is being taken.  This case presents the question 
whether a pro se notice of appeal satisfies the judgment-
designation requirement when, although it correctly identifies 
the parties to the appeal, the nature of the case, and the court 
to which the appeal is being taken, it erroneously references 
the docket number and trial date of an earlier case involving 
the same parties.  We hold that where, as here, the 
surrounding circumstances make clear which judgment the 
appellant intends to appeal and the appellee is not prejudiced 





On April 6, 2000, the appellant Aswa Mills was tried 
and convicted of assault and battery in the Territorial Court of 
the Virgin Islands.  We will refer to this case as ―the assault 
case.‖  Mills was sentenced to 30 days in custody, which he 
served.  He filed an appeal almost a year later, but quickly 
moved to withdraw it, perhaps concluding that the appeal was 
either too late or pointless.  On July 2, 2001, the motion to 
withdraw was granted by the Appellate Division of the 
District Court for the Virgin Islands (―Appellate Division‖), 
the court to which direct appeals from judgments entered by 
the Territorial Court were taken until the establishment of the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a.   
The assault case was not Mills‘ only run-in with the 
criminal justice system in 2000.  In early 2000, Mills was 
charged in the Territorial Court with (among other offenses) 
first-degree murder.  We will refer to this case as ―the murder 
case.‖  A jury convicted Mills on February 22, 2002, and, on 
March 19, 2002, Mills filed a pro se notice of appeal.
1
  It is 
undisputed that the notice was an attempt to appeal the not-
yet-entered judgment in the murder case.  The handwritten 
notice reads as follows:  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Mills was represented during the murder trial, but he elected to 
file the notice pro se because his trial counsel was not planning to 
represent him on appeal and his appellate counsel had not yet 




United States District Court for the Appeals 
United States District for the Appeals 
District of U.S. Virgin Islands 
 
File number 525/1999 re: 525–1999 [the case 
number for the assault case] 
 
Government of the Virgin Islands 
  v.  
Aswa Mills 
 
Notice is hereby given that the Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Aswa Mills hereby appeal 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit from the final judgment from an 
order of conviction entered on April 6, 2000.  
Notice is hereby given the Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Aswa A. Mills is in pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C.A. complete Annotation review 
3504(a)2, 18 U.S.C.A. 3731, and 18, 3500.  
Notice is hereby stating order of U.S.C.A. 18, 
2248 a return of [illegible].   
 
In April 2002, the Territorial Court sentenced Mills to life 
without parole, and judgment was formally entered on June 
28, 2002.   
The Clerk of the Territorial Court determined that 
Mills‘ notice of appeal pertained to the murder case and, on 
September 12, 2002, transmitted the record to the Appellate 
Division, which created a docket for the appeal.  The dockets 
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of both the Territorial Court and Appellate Division indicated 
that the appeal related to the murder case, not the assault case.   
On September 17, 2002, the Clerk of the Appellate 
Division sent Mills‘ attorney a letter, a copy of which was 
mailed to the government.  The letter referenced the case 
number for the murder case, and warned that Mills‘ appeal 
would be dismissed if he did not pay the required docketing 
fee and submit a transcript purchase order.  Mills paid the fee 
and submitted a transcript order in early October 2002.     
On April 3, 2003, the Clerk issued a briefing schedule.  
The schedule, which also referenced the murder case number 
and was sent to both sides, stated that Mills‘ opening brief 
was due by May 13, 2003.  Mills‘ attorney requested and was 
granted leave to file the brief as late as January 15, 2004.  
Still, Mills‘ brief was not filed until May 14, 2004.  Although 
it was filed late, the brief clearly indicated that Mills was 
challenging the murder conviction, not the old assault 
conviction.   
 In June 2004, the government moved to dismiss the 
appeal, arguing that Mills‘ notice of appeal was fatally 
defective.  In 2006, over two years after the motion had been 
filed, Mills‘ attorney finally filed a response.  Not long 
thereafter, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court disbarred Mills‘ 
attorney, and a new attorney was appointed to represent Mills.   
 After Mills‘ new attorney had appeared, the Appellate 
Division held a status conference and requested supplemental 
briefing on the motion to dismiss, which the parties dutifully 
provided.  On February 5, 2010, the Appellate Division 
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granted the motion to dismiss.  It concluded that it could not 
entertain Mills‘ appeal because his notice of appeal failed to 
comply with Virgin Islands Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c), 
under which a notice must ―designate the judgment . . . 
appealed from.‖  The notice was insufficient, the Court 
opined, because it listed the case number for, and the date of 
the trial in, the assault case, and did not reference the murder 
case.  The court so held even though the government had 
never represented that it was actually prejudiced or misled by 
the defects in the notice.
2
   
 Mills filed the instant appeal (this time using a flawless 
notice of appeal). 
II. Jurisdiction 
The Appellate Division had jurisdiction under 48 
U.S.C. § 1613a(a).  This Court has jurisdiction under 48 
U.S.C. § 1613a(c).   
                                                 
2
 The government had also argued that Mills‘ notice was untimely 
because it was filed before judgment was entered in the murder 
case.  The Appellate Division rightly rejected this argument.  As 
the government now concedes, the March 19 notice, which was 
filed after the jury‘s guilty verdict was announced but before the 
formal entry of judgment, was timely under Virgin Islands Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 5(b)(1), which provides that ―[a] notice of 
appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, sentence, or 
order—but before entry of the judgment or order—is treated as 
filed on the date of and after the entry of judgment.‖  See also 
FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 
276–77 (1991) (applying the federal version of Rule 5(b)(1)). 
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III. Standard of Review 
The Appellate Division‘s decision rests on an 
interpretation of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  The Rules were adopted by the Appellate 
Division and have the status of local rules.  See Guam Sasaki 
Corp. v. Diana’s Inc., 881 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1989).  The 
law of this Circuit is not clear as to the standard of review that 
applies to a court‘s interpretation of its own local rules.  We 
take this opportunity to offer clarification.   
When we first addressed the issue, we held that an 
appellate court generally owes deference to a district court‘s 
interpretation of its local rules.  United States v. Miller, 624 
F.2d 1198, 1200–01 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Hawes v. Club 
Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 143–44 (1st Cir. 
1976); Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 783–
84 (9th Cir. 1970)); see also United States v. Costanzo, 740 
F.2d 251, 258–59 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting in passing that ―the 
interpretation of the local rules of a district court by one of its 
judges is entitled to deference‖).  Miller recognizes that the 
court that promulgates a rule is usually the best arbiter of its 
meaning.   
More recent cases from this Circuit, however, seem to 
treat a court‘s interpretation of one of its local rules as a 
garden-variety legal issue, and state that a plenary standard of 
review applies.  D’Iorio v. Majestic Lanes, Inc., 370 F.3d 
354, 356 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004) (―We . . . exercise plenary review 
over the District Court‘s interpretation of the local rules at 
issue.‖); Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 
F.2d 168, 171, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1990) (―The issue presented 
by the district court‘s application and interpretation of [one of 
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its own local rules] is . . . one over which we exercise plenary 
review.‖ (citing Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173, 175 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (appellate review is plenary where the ―issues 
involve the selection, interpretation, and application of legal 
precepts‖))).   
Our more recent decisions must be disregarded to the 
extent they are at odds with Miller.  See Holland v. N.J. Dep’t 
of Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 278 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) (―[T]o the 
extent that [a case within this Circuit] is read to be 
inconsistent with earlier case law, the earlier case law . . . 
controls.‖ (citing O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 
340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981))).  This brings the law of this Circuit 
into harmony with the law of our sister circuits on the issue.  
See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 
2009) (appellate court owes deference to a district court‘s 
interpretation of its local rules); Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 
361 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); Whitfield v. Scully, 
241 F.3d 264, 270–71 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Smith v. Vill. of 
Maywood, 970 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1992) (―Generally 
speaking, we prefer to defer to the district courts when 
interpreting their local rules.‖); Guam Sasaki, 881 F.2d at 715 
(same); 12 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 3153 (2d ed. 1997) (collecting cases).   
Notwithstanding Miller‘s general rule that deference is 
owed to a court‘s interpretation of its local rules, we believe 
that a plenary standard of review is appropriate in this case.  
Although the Appellate Division‘s decision was technically 
based on an interpretation of the Virgin Islands Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Court noted that the Virgin Islands 
Rules are identical in relevant respects to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.  Accordingly, it relied exclusively on 
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cases applying the Federal Rules to justify dismissal of the 
appeal.  As a practical matter, then, the Appellate Division‘s 
decision rests on an interpretation of the Federal Rules, which 
requires us to conduct plenary review.  See L-3 Commc’ns 
Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 607 F.3d 24, 27–28 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(plenary standard of review applies to ―a district court‘s 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure‖); 
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 459 (3d Cir. 
2000) (same, regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 
Miller, 624 F.2d at 1200–02 (exercising plenary review over a 
district court‘s interpretation of one of its local rules insofar 
as the rule simply incorporated state law, interpretations of 
which are subject to plenary review); cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977) (holding that 
the Supreme Court may review state-court judgments that rest 
on state law when the state court ―felt compelled by what it 
understood to be federal constitutional considerations to 
construe and apply its own law in the manner it did‖).   
IV. Discussion 
The Appellate Division dismissed Mills‘ appeal 
pursuant to Virgin Islands Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c), 
which provides that a notice of appeal is ineffective if it does 
not ―designate the judgment [or] order . . . appealed from.‖  
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) likewise provides 
that a notice of appeal must ―designate the judgment [or] 
order . . . being appealed,‖ so decisions applying Federal Rule 
3(c)‘s judgment-designation requirement will control our 
analysis.   
―‗[D]ismissal of an appeal for failure to comply with 
procedural rules is not favored.‘‖  United States v. Carelock, 
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459 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Horner Equip. 
Int’l, Inc. v. Seascape Pool Ctr., Inc., 884 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 
1989)); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181–82 
(1962); Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 
144 (3d Cir. 1998) (―[D]ecisions on the merits are not to be 
avoided on grounds of technical violations of procedural 
rules.‖).  Courts therefore construe appeal notices liberally.  
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992); Torres v. Oakland 
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988); Drinkwater v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1990).  The 
duty to construe appeal notices liberally is heightened in cases 
involving pro se appellants.  See Coppedge v. United States, 
369 U.S. 438, 442 n.5 (1962); Smith v. Grams, 565 F.3d 
1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 2009) (―When a party proceeds pro se, . . 
. we will, if possible, liberally construe his actions to find 
Rule 3‘s requirements satisfied.‖); Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 
F.3d 317, 320 (1st Cir. 2003).  Indeed, the local rules of this 
Court and of the Appellate Division provide that a document 
filed by a pro se litigant after the decision of the trial court in 
a criminal case will be treated as a notice of appeal ―despite 
informality in its form or title, if it evidences an intention to 
appeal.‖  3rd Cir. LAR 3.4 (2010); V.I. R. App. P. 4(g). 
The purpose ―of a notice of appeal, of course, is to 
notify the court of appeals and the opposing party that an 
appeal is being taken.‖  Torres, 487 U.S. at 323–24 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting).  Courts employ a commonsense, purposive 
approach to determine whether a notice of appeal complies 
with the rules.  See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 
387 (1978); Matute v. Procoast Navigation Ltd., 928 F.2d 
627, 629 (3d Cir. 1991); Dura Sys., Inc. v. Rothbury Invs., 
Ltd., 886 F.2d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1989); Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) 
advisory committee‘s note (―[S]o long as the function of 
11 
 
notice is met by the filing of a paper indicating an intention to 
appeal, the substance of the rule has been complied with.‖).  
Thus, the Supreme Court has said that ―imperfections in 
noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt 
exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which 
appellate court.‖  Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 
(2001). 
Under the purposive approach taken by the courts, a 
notice of appeal that fails to strictly comply with the 
judgment-designation requirement will nevertheless be 
deemed adequate if, ―‗in light of all the circumstances,‘‖ 
FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 276 n.6 (quoting Torres, 487 U.S. at 
316), it is reasonably clear which judgment the party seeks to 
appeal.  See Foman, 371 U.S. at 181–82; Torres, 487 U.S. at 
322–23 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Castillo-Rodriguez v. INS, 
929 F.2d 181, 183–84 (5th Cir. 1991) (―[A] party does not 
forfeit the right to appeal by designating the wrong judgment 
as long as it is clear which judgment the party intends to 
appeal.‖).  This means that as long as the judgment the party 
intends to appeal is fairly discernible, a notice of appeal will 
be deemed sufficient even though it references the wrong case 
number, see Marshall v. Lancarte, 632 F.2d 1196, 1197 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Scherer v. Kelly, 584 F.2d 170, 174–75 (7th Cir. 
1978), or the wrong judgment date, see Flieger v. Delo, 12 
F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir. 1993); Schneider v. Colegio de 
Abogados de P.R., 917 F.2d 620, 630 (1st Cir. 1990).   
In assessing the adequacy of a flawed appeal notice, a 
court should also consider whether the opposing party was 
misled or prejudiced by the errors.  See Sanabria v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 54, 67 n.21 (1978); Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. 
at 387; Foman, 371 U.S. at 181; Matute, 928 F.2d at 629 (a 
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notice of appeal will generally be deemed sufficient ―unless 
[it] is so inadequate as to prejudice the opposing party‖); 
Keller v. Petsock, 849 F.2d 839, 842 (3d Cir. 1988).  While a 
lack of prejudice will not save a notice that totally fails to 
comply with the rules, see Smith, 502 U.S. at 248; Torres, 
487 U.S. at 317, courts understandably are more willing to 
overlook a notice‘s flaws in the absence of prejudice to the 
opposing party, see Bankers Trust, 435 U.S. at 387; FirsTier, 
498 U.S. at 276 (observing that, where the opposing party is 
not prejudiced by mistakes made in the process of noticing an 
appeal, ―[l]ittle would be accomplished by prohibiting the 
court of appeals from reaching the merits‖); Matute, 928 F.2d 
at 629.     
We now turn to the case at hand.  The Appellate 
Division concluded that Mills‘ notice did not satisfy the 
judgment-designation requirement because it referenced the 
case number for the assault case and indicated that Mills was 
appealing the criminal conviction entered on April 6, 2000 
(the date of trial in the assault case).  Whether Mills‘ notice 
was sufficient is a close question, and there is something to be 
said for the Appellate Division‘s analysis.  But ultimately, we 
conclude that the notice, though error-laden, was not so 
inadequate that it should prevent Mills‘ appeal from being 
considered on the merits.        
The notice indicated that Mills was appealing the 
criminal conviction entered in ―Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Aswa Mills‖ to the ―United States District Court for 
the Appeals . . . District of U.S. Virgin Islands.‖
3
  By 
                                                 
3
 Oddly, the body of the notice also said that Mills was appealing 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  But 
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including this information, the notice limited the universe of 
judgments possibly being appealed to two judgments: the one 
entered in the 2000 assault case and the one entered in the 
2002 murder case.
4
  The question, then, is whether, ―‗in light 
of all the circumstances,‘‖ FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 276 n.6 
(quoting Torres, 487 U.S. at 316), it was reasonably clear that 
Mills intended to appeal the murder conviction.  If it was, 
then his appeal should go forward on the merits.   
Having examined the notice and the particular facts of 
the case, we think it was reasonably clear that Mills was 
appealing the murder conviction.  When Mills filed the 
notice, the assault case had long been closed, Mills had 
completed service of the sentence he received on the assault 
conviction, he had filed and withdrawn an appeal of the 
assault conviction, and he had just been convicted in the 
murder case.  In these circumstances, the government should 
have known that Mills was appealing the murder conviction, 
not the dusty old assault conviction.  Indeed, the Clerks of 
both the Territorial Court and Appellate Division figured out 
that the notice related to the murder conviction and proceeded 
accordingly.  Moreover, the government has not established 
                                                                                                             
the Appellate Division did not cite this error as a basis for 
dismissing the appeal, nor has the government defended the 
Court‘s dismissal on this ground.  In any event, this sort of defect 
is not fatal when, as here, only one appellate forum is available.  
See Keller, 849 F.2d at 842; Freeman v. Petsock, 820 F.2d 628, 
630 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
4
 Nothing in the record suggests that there are any other cases 





that it was misled into believing that Mills was appealing the 
assault conviction, or that it was otherwise prejudiced by the 
errors contained in Mills‘ notice.  Given the absence of such 
prejudice, ―[l]ittle would be accomplished by prohibiting the 
[Appellate Division] from reaching the merits‖ of Mills‘ 
appeal.  FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 276.
5
  We conclude, then, that 
Mills‘ notice was sufficient and that his appeal should be 
considered on the merits. 
In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked 
United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2006).  In 
that case, defendant Olanda Carelock, acting through his 
attorney, filed a notice of appeal that did not include his name 
and indeed listed another defendant‘s name, listed the wrong 
case number, listed the wrong district judge‘s name, and 
referenced the wrong judgment date.  Id. at 439.  We 
dismissed the appeal.  We reasoned that, although the notice 
was filed on Carelock‘s electronic docket, it failed to satisfy 
Federal Rule 3(c), as the circumstances ―compel[led] the 
conclusion that [the other defendant] (the individual actually 
named on the notice) and not Carelock intended to take an 
appeal, and that the notice had been mistakenly filed in 
Carelock‘s case.‖  Id. at 443.  
 Carelock is not controlling.  For one thing, Mills‘ 
notice must be construed with added charity because it was 
filed pro se, while Carelock‘s notice was filed by counsel.  
                                                 
5
 Even if the government had been confused, it could have 
obtained clarification by examining the Territorial Court‘s and 
Appellate Division‘s dockets, both of which indicated that Mills‘ 




See Grams, 565 F.3d at 1041; Campiti, 333 F.3d at 320.  
More importantly, unlike the notice in Carelock, Mills‘ notice 
correctly identified the parties to the appeal, thus narrowing 
the universe of judgments potentially being challenged to 
two.  And although Mills‘ notice, like Carelock‘s, listed the 
wrong case number and judgment date, the surrounding 
circumstances made clear which judgment Mills intended to 
appeal.  No such clarifying circumstances were present in 
Carelock.  In fact, the circumstances there led the government 
to believe that the individual actually named on the notice, 
not Carelock, intended to take an appeal and that the notice 
had inadvertently been filed on Carelock‘s docket.  See 459 
F.3d at 443 & n.9.     
V. Conclusion 
 We acknowledge that Mills‘ notice of appeal was rife 
with errors.  If courts took a formalistic approach to judging 
the sufficiency of appeal notices, Mills‘ notice would surely 
be held insufficient.  But our jurisprudence has eschewed 
formalism in favor of a contextual approach that construes 
appeal notices liberally, especially in cases that, like this one, 
involve pro se appellants.  Viewed through an appropriately 
forgiving lens, Mills‘ notice was sufficient, if just barely.  We 
will reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and 
remand for further proceedings.   
 
